Several authors have proposed sketches as a suitable specification mechanism for specifying databases. When specifying a database, the finite models of the specification are of greatest importance, since an actual database is of course always a finite structure. In database theory however, it has recently been recognised that it is useful to allow for a restricted kind of infiniteness in the models of a data specification. The models are then so-called metafinite structures. In this paper, we consider a sketch based specification of metafinite structures, and we develop and prove correct an algorithm to decide the semantical equivalence of the corresponding data specifications. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first algorithm for deciding semantical equivalence for a non-trivial class of specifications for metafinite structures.
Introduction
Many structures operated upon by computer programs can conveniently be considered to consist of two parts. The first part is a finite, variable structure, which is completely represented in the program and which varies with every run, or even during the run of the program. The elements of this finite structure are labelled with elements of a second, possibly infinite, but fixed structure. Consider for example a program for the travelling salesman problem. This program operates on graphs, whose arrows are labelled with numbers (say natural numbers). The finite variable part is the graph, and the program will usually contain a representation of the entire graph. Subsequent runs of the programs will usually operate on different graphs. The infinite fixed part is the set of natural numbers (with the usual operations). Although the program will, at any given moment of time, consider only a finite number of natural numbers, it is convenient, when reasoning about the program, to consider the infinite part also in its entirety. So the mathematical structures manipulated by computer programs can often be subdivided in a finite, variable part and a possibly infinite fixed part, where the elements of the variable part are labelled (again in a variable way) by elements of the fixed part. Let us call such a structure a metafinite structure, following the terminology introduced by Grädel and Gurevich ([GG95] ).
In particular, a database (say for instance a relational database) is a structure manipulated by a computer program, and it can conveniently be subdivided in two such parts. The database consists of a finite set of finite relations over a number of (possibly) infinite domains. Hence, the tables containing the tuples of the relations are the finite variable part, and the domains are the infinite fixed part. It is clear that, during the evolution of the database, when facts are added or deleted, the tables containing the tuples will vary, but the infinite domains remain fixed. Again, at any given moment of time, only a finite part of these possibly infinite domains is actually present in the database. However, since the domains are usually well-known mathematical structures, like the natural or rational numbers, or the monoid of strings over some alphabet, it is again more convenient to consider them in their entirety when reasoning about the database. This point is stressed in a very convincing way by Grädel and Gurevich ([GG95] ).
Hence, already when building a semantic data specification, whose models will be structures manipulated by a computer program, it will be advantageous to incorporate in such a specification the separation between the variable finite part and the fixed infinite part. The signature for such structures will contain a signature to talk about the variable part, a signature to talk about the fixed part, and some labelling functions going from the variable part to the fixed part.
The sketch based approach to semantic data specifications extends very naturally to specifying metafinite structures because in this approach a clear separation is made between the entitities (the finite part) and the attributes (the infinite part) ( [Pie96, PS95, PS97a] ). Grosso modo, the sketch based approach to metafinite data specifications looks as follows:
-For the finite part, we use finitary sketches ( [BW90, AR94] ) as the specification logic. These sketches have more or less the expressivity of first-order logic with the addition of an operator constructing the reflexive symmetric and transitive closure of a relation. Any suitable logic to specify finite structures will certainly contain this as a fragment. -For the infinite part, we only consider products of unstructured sets. Ele-ments of the finite part can be labelled with tuples of elements from unstructured sets.
Although this is clearly insufficient as a general specification formalism, it is an interesting starting point, because it covers a very large part of the existing formalisms (like Entity Relationship diagrams) for semantic data specifications ( [Pie96] ). This paper is structured as follows. First, in section 2, we prove a number of undecidability results concerning finite finitary sketches. These results serve to show that the semantical equivalence problem in general is undecidable. In section 3, we recall some definitions and previous results from the sketch based approach to semantic data modelling. Then, in section 4, we define the class of thin FM specifications, and for this class of specifications we prove that semantical equivalence is decidable. Finally, in section 5, we summarize the results of this paper, and compare with related work.
Finite satisfiability of finite finitary sketches
One of the main components of the semantic data specifications that will be defined in this paper is a sketch. In this section, we prove a number of undecidability results for sketches. These undecidability results are not surprising, but because of the practical relevance, it is interesting to see them proved. In section 3, we will use these results to prove the undecidability of the general semantical equivalence problem. We prove the undecidability results by means of a satisfiability preserving translation from classical first-order logic to sketches.
The correspondence between sketches and classical logic has been investigated thoroughly. Usually, the expressive power of sketches and fragments of logic is compared by comparing their classes of model categories in Set. The locally presentable categories are exactly the model categories of both limit sketches, and limit theories. Moreover, this correspondence also holds when restricted to the finitary case: the locally finitely presentable categories are exactly the model categories of finitary limit sketches, and finitary limit theories. The locally accessible categories are exactly the model categories of both sketches and so-called basic theories. However this second correspondence does not hold when restricted to the finitary case. A finitely accessible category need not be axiomatizable in a finitary basic theory, and a finitary basic theory may have a model category that is not finitely accessible. All these facts are treated in detail by Adámek and Rosický ([AR94] ). For finitary sketches, it has been proved recently ([AR95a,AR95c,APJR96]) that they are equivalent (i.e. have the same model categories) to σ-coherent theories. Adámek and Rosický ( [AR95b] ) have proved that the equivalence between finitary sketches and σ-coherent theories also holds when one considers models in FinSet.
It is clear that the correspondence between sketches and string-based logic is not very straightforward when one studies this correspondence based on the categories of models. In particular, there is no clear correspondence with classical finitary first-order logic. To transfer some of the results obtained on classical first-order logic, it would be interesting to have some kind of correspondence between classical (finitary) first-order logic and finitary sketches. In this section, we describe such a correspondence.
The rest of this section is structured as follows. In section 2.1, we recall some basic definitions concerning classical logic and sketches. Then, in section 2.2, we describe a translation from classical first-order logic to finite finitary sketches, and we prove that this translation preserves satisfiability. In section 2.3, we prove a number of undecidability results, based on this translation.
Logic and sketches
We first give precise definitions of classical finitary first-order logic and of sketches, and then we discuss the known connections between them. The definitions given in this section are all elementary, but since both classical logic and sketches can be presented in many different ways, we prefer to state the definitions clearly before we embark on constructing a translation between them.
Classical finitary first-order logic
We describe a minimalistic version of classical finitary first-order logic. A logical language is determined by giving a set of relation symbols, denoted σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . Every relation symbol has an associated arity, which is a natural number. We assume that a countable set of variables is given. Variables are denoted x 1 , x 2 , . . .
The atomic formulae of the language are syntactic expressions of the form x i = x j (with x i and x j variables) or σ(x k 1 , x k 2 , . . . , x kn ) where n is the arity of the relation symbol σ.
The formulae of the given logical language are built up from the atomic formulae using the logical combinators ¬, ∧ and the quantifier ∃. More precisely: all atomic formulae are formulae, and if φ is a formula, then ¬φ and (∃x)φ are formulae, and if φ and ψ are formulae, then φ ∧ ψ is a formula. The other logical connectors and the universal quantifier can be defined in terms of the connectors and quantifier given above.
The free variables of a formula are defined in the standard way. A sentence is a formula without any free variables.
A theory in a given logical language is a set of formulae of that logical language.
An interpretation of a logical language consists of a set U , and for each relation symbol σ of arity n an n-ary relation on U . Given such an interpretation, any formula φ with free variables x 1 , . . . , x n defines an n-ary relation on U , called the extension of φ in the interpretation. We say the formula is satisfied if this extension is the total relation (i.e. is the n-th cartesian power of U ). A model of a theory is an interpretation, such that each formula of the theory is satisfied. A theory is satisfiable if there exists a model.
Finitary sketches
We stick to the definition of sketch, given by Barr and Wells in [BW90] . Hence, a sketch is a quadruple (G, D, L, K), with G a graph, D a set of diagrams in G, L a set of cones in G and K a set of cocones in G. The sketch is finitary if each of the cones and cocones in L and K is finite. The sketch is finite if G and each of the sets D, L, K is finite.
A model of a sketch (G, D, L, K) in a category C (e.g. Set or FinSet), is a graph homomorphism from G to C, taking each diagram in D to a commutative diagram, each cone in L to a limit cone, and each cocone in K to a colimit cocone.
We will freely use the notational conventions for sketches described in [BW90] . In particular, this means that if we introduce an object in the graph G, with name a 1 × a 2 × · · · × a n , then this implies that there are already objects with names a 1 up to a n , and moreover this implies that there is a cone p i : a 1 × a 2 × · · · × a n → a i in L. The name a n is an abbreviation for a × a × · · · × a (n times). Moreover, if there is an arrow in G, decorated with a tip in the front (like f : A / / / / B ), this implies that the following cone is in L (i.e. this implies f is mono in every model):
Connections between string-based logic and sketches
As already discussed above, the connections between sketches and classical, string-based logic, are usually studied by looking at the model categories of specifications in both formalisms. A class of sketches and a fragment of logic are said to be equivalent if they give rise to the same class of model categories. For example, in this sense, sketches are equivalent to (infinitary) basic theories.
Here, we will describe a correspondence between sketches and classical firstorder logic from a different point of view. We will describe a translation from a first-order theory to a sketch with the property that every model of the theory defines a model of the sketch and vice-versa. Hence, in a sense, the model categories have 'the same objects', even though they don't have 'the same morphisms'. In particular, the model category of the logical theory is empty iff the model category of the corresponding sketch is empty. Or, in other words, the translation preserves satisfiability.
A satisfiability-preserving translation
Given a logical theory T in a logical language L, we will construct a corresponding finitary sketch S T . The construction happens in three stages. First, we construct the sketch corresponding to a logical language. Then, we show how logical formulae can be represented in the sketch. And finally, we show how a logical formula can be required to be satisfied in every model.
The sketch corresponding to a logical language
We start with proving the (obvious and easy) fact that interpretations of a logical language can be captured by means of a sketch.
Lemma 1 For every logical language L, there exists a finitary sketch S L such that every interpretation of L defines a model of S L , and vice-versa.
In fact, we could say something stronger: the category of interpretations of L is equivalent to the category of models of S L .
Proof. Let L consist of the relation symbols σ i , and let a i be the arity of σ i . Let A be the set of all the a i . The sketch S L will have the following objects:
-An object U .
-An object U k for all k ∈ A. -An object S σ i for each relation symbol σ i .
(Recall our notational conventions for objects: the fact that an object U k is introduced implies that the necessary arrows and cones making this the k-th power of U are also introduced.)
The sketch has the following arrows:
(Recall our notational conventions for arrows: for each arrow introduced above, a cone will be added stating that this arrow must be mono)
A model of this sketch in Set will assign a set to U , and a subset of the a i -th power of U to each S σ i . In other words, models of the sketch S L and interpretations of the logical language L are essentially the same. 2
Note that, if L is finite, then S L will also be finite. Note also that finite models of L define finite models of S L and vice-versa.
Representing a logical formula in a sketch
Now, given a formula φ in a logical language L, we will show how we can extend the sketch S L (in a conservative way) so that it contains an arrow φ which is taken to the extension of φ in every model. More precisely, we prove:
k (where k is the number of free variables of φ) such that this arrow is taken by M to the extension of φ in I.
Proof outline Only an outline of the proof is given. The full proof can be found in [Pie98] . Essentially, one has to prove that the extension of a formula φ can be computed by (finitary) limits and colimits, starting from the arrows
representing the interpretation of the relation symbols of the logical language. This is shown by induction on the size of the formula φ. We proceed as follows. We assume that a model of the sketch S L (or equivalently, an interpretation of the underlying logical language of T ) is given. For any formula φ with n free variables, we will compute an arrow φ : [φ] → U n together with an isomorphism l φ from the set n = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} to the set of free variables of φ. This arrow [φ] represents the extension of the formula φ in the following sense: Let µ be a mapping of the free variables of φ to U (the universe of the given interpretation); φ is satisfied by this mapping iff the arrow
The computation of the arrow φ will start from the interpretation of the arrows of the sketch S L in the given model of S L , and moreover, the computation will be done using only finitary limits and colimits.
In this outline, we only consider the case of an atomic formula σ(x k 1 , . . . , x kr ) and the case of the formula ¬φ. All other cases (which are similar) are discussed in the full proof in [Pie98] .
The formula σ(x k 1 , . . . , x kr ). Consider an atomic formula σ(x k 1 , . . . , x kr ) where σ is a relation symbol of arity r. Let the set of free variables of this formula have cardinality n. Pick an arbitrary bijection l σ(x k 1 ,...,x kr ) : n → FV(σ(x k 1 , . . . , x kr )) (we will abbreviate the name of this morphism to l). The arrow σ(x k 1 , . . . , x kr ) is computed by the following pullback.
It is straightforward to verify that this arrow indeed represents the extension of σ(x k 1 , . . . , x kr ).
The formula ¬φ. Suppose l φ is the isomorphism from n to the set of free variables of φ. ¬φ has the same set of free variables, and we take l ¬φ to be equal to l φ . By induction, we assume we have an arrow φ representing φ. We take ¬φ to be the complement of this arrow (and this complement is unique up to isomorphism in Set or FinSet). This complement is completely determined in Set or FinSet by requiring the following cocone to be a sum-cocone.
It is again easy to prove that ¬φ correctly represents the formula ¬φ. Note however that, when we will use this construction in a sketch, this will strongly influence the homomorphisms of models of the sketch. Although the sketch will have in essence the same models as the logical theory, there will be much less homomorphisms between models of the sketch than there are homomorphisms between models of the logical theory. 2
The sketch corresponding to a logical theory
Theorem 3 For every finite logical theory T , there exists a finite finitary sketch S T , such that every model of T defines a model of S T and vice-versa.
Moreover, every finite model of T defines a finite model of S T and vice-versa.
Contrary to the situation in lemma 1, it is not true here, that the model categories of T and S T are equivalent. The theorem does generalize to the infinite case, but since we do not need this generalization, this will not be proved.
Proof. Every finite logical theory is equivalent to a theory containing only one sentence (first take the universal closure of all formulae in the theory, and then combine all the resulting sentences by taking their conjunction). Let this sentence be φ. Construct the sketch S φ L whose existence is assured by lemma 2. By lemma 2, the object [φ] will be taken to the empty set if φ is not satisfied in a model, and to the terminal set if φ is satisfied. Hence, to construct S T , it suffices to add one cone to S φ L stating that the object [φ] must be taken to the terminal object. The proof of the last sentence of the theorem is trivial. 2
Finite satisfiability and equivalence
The satisfiability preserving translation (theorem 3) is used to prove the undecidability of a number of interesting problems.
First recall that finite satisfiability of a finite first-order theory is undecidable. A proof of this result can be found in [AHV95] . Note that this result is quite different from the classical result that satisfiability (allowing infinite models) of a first-order theory is undecidable. Satisfiability of a first-order theory is co-semi-decidable, whereas finite satisfiability is semi-decidable.
Given theorem 3, we immediately obtain as a corollary:
Corollary 4 The problem of determining whether a finite finitary sketch has a finite model is undecidable.
Proof. Suppose this problem was decidable. By the construction of theorem 3, we could decide the finite satisfiability problem for classical first-order logic. But this is known to be undecidable. Contradiction. 2
Corollary 5 The (finite) equivalence problem for finite finitary sketches is undecidable.
The finite equivalence problem is the problem of determining whether two sketches have equivalent model categories in FinSet.
Proof. It is easy to construct a finite finitary sketch that is not satisfiable. Take for example the sketch with one object, a cone stating that the object is terminal, and a cocone stating that the object is initial. Another finite finitary sketch will be equivalent to this sketch iff it has no finite models. But this is undecidable by corollary 4. 2
It should be noted that the equivalence problem is in general much harder than the satisfiability problem. For instance, for finite limit sketches satisfiability is a trivial problem (every finite limit sketch is satisfiable), but the equivalence problem is undecidable.
Data specifications
In this section, we recall definitions and known results from the sketch based approach to semantic data modelling. For more details, and an extensive motivation of the usefulness of this approach, see [Pie96, PS97a, PS95] .
General data specifications
Essentially, the goal of a data specification is to build a mathematical description of a small part of the real world. This part of the real world is called the Universe of Discourse (UoD) in database theory. As explained in the introduction, the mathematical structures that will be used to describe the UoD are finite models of sketches, together with a labelling of all the elements of these models by elements of possibly infinite sets of values.
Hence, a data specification consists of two parts. The first part is a sketch, and this sketch specifies the structure and the interdependencies of the various entities about which we want to store information. The second part indicates what kind of information we want to store about each type of entity: for each type of entity, we give its set of possible attribute values, i.e. the set of all possible labels that an entity of the given type can have.
Definitions
Definition 6 A data specification consists of:
, where G is a graph, D is a set of diagrams in G (that must be taken to commutative diagrams in a model), L is a set of cones in G (that must be taken to limit cones in a model) and K is a set of cocones in G (that must be taken to colimit cocones in a model). (ii) for each T ∈ G 0 , a finite set A T , called the set of attributes of entity type T , and for each a ∈ A T an attribute set S T (a).
The objects of G are called entity types, the arrows are called dependencies between entity types.
Often, it is convenient to group all the information concerning the attributes into one functor, called the attribute functor. We define the attribute functor A : G 0 → Set by:
where the product of an empty family of sets is the terminal set. The functor A maps an entity type T to the set of all possible labels that entities of type T can attain in a model. The projection from A(T ) to S T (a) will be denoted as p a . 
Notational conventions
Definition 9 A source in a category C is a pair (X, (f i ) i∈I ) consisting of an object X of C and a family of morphisms f i : X → Y i of C, indexed by some set I.
A source is finite if the indexing set I is finite. If the indexing function i → f i is injective, then we say that the source is a source without doubles. Any source can be reduced to a source without doubles by striking out all the duplicates, i.e. take the epi-mono factorization of the indexing function, and retain only the mono-part.
A source (X, (f i ) i∈I ) is a mono source if f i • x = f i • y for all i ∈ I implies that x = y. Note that a source is mono iff its associated source without doubles is mono.
In data specifications, one often wants to state that a certain source in the graph G must be taken to a mono source in each model. Therefore, we introduce a special notation for this: a data specification may contain a set M of sources in G (called monicity constraints), and each of these sources must be taken to a mono source in every model. This is a pure syntactic extension of data specifications: every monicity constraint could be removed by adding an appropriate cone to L.
Secondly, we propose a suitable notation for the attribute part of a specification. We define the attributes and attribute sets by defining the attribute functor A. The value of the attribute functor on an entity type T will be denoted as follows:
where the a i are the attributes of entity type T , and where S T (a i ) is the attribute set corresponding to attribute a i . Recall that A(T ) is defined to be the product of all the S T (a i ).
Examples of data specifications will be given in section 3.2. The interested reader can find many examples, commented in detail in [Pie96] .
Semantical equivalence of data specifications
Semantical equivalence is meant to capture the informal notion of "describing the same part of the real world". A number of possible formal definitions for this notion have been studied and compared in [PS97a, Pie96] . The following definition seems the most appropriate:
Definition 10 Two data specifications are semantically equivalent iff their model categories are equivalent as categories.
Theorem 11 Semantical equivalence is undecidable.
Proof. Consider data specifications with no attributes (the attribute functor is the constant functor on 1). The model category of such a specification is exactly the category of FinSet-valued models of the underlying sketch of the data specification. Hence, an algorithm to decide semantical equivalence would, for this special case, be an algorithm to decide finite equivalence of sketches. But, by corollary 5, this is an undecidable problem. 2
Partial solutions to the semantical equivalence problem have been proposed. In [PS97a] , an incomplete and interactive algorithm for deciding semantical equivalence is described. This algorithm tries to establish an equivalence between the theories of the underlying sketches of the data specifications.
In [Pie96, PS94, PS95] , subclasses of data specifications have been defined, for which the semantical equivalence problem is decidable. We recall some of these results in the next section, since the development of the new algorithm in section 4 will rely on them.
Finite Mono specifications
Finite Mono specifications (or FM specifications in short) are a special kind of data specifications, for which the semantical equivalence problem is more manageable. Moreover, they are important from a practical point of view, because they encompass Entity Relationship diagrams ([Che76]).
Definitions
Definition 12 An FM specification is a triple (C, M, A), where C is a finite category, M is a finite set of finite sources in C, and A : C 0 → Set is a functor. FM specifications are clearly a special case of the general definition of data specifications.
Example 14 Let N denote the set of natural numbers, and S the set of strings over the ASCII alphabet. Both these sets are infinite. The following specifica-tion is an example of an FM specification: 
A model (M, λ) must be understood as follows. The model M of the sketch associates with each entity type the set of entities of that type existing in the real world (e.g. it associates a set of three persons with the PERSON type). The labelling λ will label each of these persons with a natural number (the age), a string (the name) and an element of {male, female}. Arrows in the graph indicate dependencies: an entity of the source type is always associated with an entity of the target type (e.g. a member is always associated with a person and with a library). Such dependencies are taken to functions between the sets of entities by M .
For a more detailed discussion of this example, see [Pie96, PS97a] .
Semantical equivalence of FM specifications
Since FM specifications are much less expressive than general data specifications, the semantical equivalence problem is less hard. It is known, for instance ( [PS95] ), that semantical equivalence is decidable in the case that all attribute sets are finite.
For FM specifications with infinite attribute sets, no algorithm to decide semantical equivalence has been found yet. In the next section, we will present an algorithm for an important subclass of FM specifications. The correctness proof of this algorithm will rely on the property of FM specifications to allow for selective elimination of attributes ( [PS97b] ). We briefly recall what selective elimination of attributes is.
Suppose we are given an FM specification (C, M, A), a functor X : C 0 → FinSet (which we also sometimes consider as X : C 0 → Set) and a natural transformation α : A → X. Let, as usual, I : C 0 → C be the inclusion, I * : Fun(C, Set) → Fun(C 0 , Set the functor of composition with I, and (−) ! : Fun(C 0 , Set) → Fun(C, Set) the right adjoint to I * . Hence X ! will be the right Kan extension of X along I. We want to construct a new FM specification (C , M , A ). We define:
-C = X ! , where F is the category of elements of a Set-valued functor F . -M = {µ | Π(µ) ∈ M}, where Π is the canonical projection of X ! on C.
It remains to define A . Note that A must be a set, typed by the objects of X ! . Since the elements of I * (X ! ) are in bijection with the objects of X ! , it suffices to give an arrow α : A → I * (X ! ) in Fun(C 0 , Set). We define this arrow to be the pullback of α along the counit of the adjunction between I * and (−) ! . Hence, the following square is a pullback square:
This defines the functor A : C 0 → Set up to natural isomorphism.
We say that (C , M , A ) is obtained from (C, M, A) by elimination over α.
The functor X and the natural transformation α must be seen as the definition of a partition on the sets of attribute values. What attribute elimination does, is introducing a new entity type for each equivalence class in this partition, and this in such a way that the resulting specification is semantically equivalent.
Theorem 15 Let (C , M , A ) be obtained from (C, M, A) by elimination over α : A → X. If X ! satisfies the monicity conditions in M, then the model categories of (C, M, A) and (C , M , A ) are equivalent.
This theorem is proved in [PS97b] .
Example 16 Consider again specification (1). We want to eliminate the attribute Sex from the entity type PERSON. Therefore, we consider a partition of the attribute sets which separates the elements male and female, but which does not separate any other elements. In other words we consider the natural transformation α : A → X where X is the functor taking PERSON to {male, female} and taking all other entity types to the terminal set, and where α PERSON is the projection on the set {male, female} and all other components of α are the unique functions into the terminal set. It is straightforward to verify that X ! satisfies all monicity conditions. Eliminating over α gives us the following specification: By theorem 15, we know that specifications (1) and (2) are semantically equivalent.
Thin Finite Mono specifications
Following the terminology in [BW90] , we call a category thin iff all the homsets have at most one element. Thin Finite Mono specifications are Finite Mono specifications with a thin underlying category. Hence, all the results proved for FM specifications are also valid for Thin FM specifications. In particular, equivalence is decidable if all attribute sets are finite, and attributes can be selectively eliminated.
In addition, we will prove in this paper, that for Thin Finite Mono specifications, attributes can be introduced selectively, and we will show that Thin Finite Mono specifications can be reduced to a canonical form, where as many attributes have been introduced as possible. Reduction to normal form provides a new algorithm for deciding equivalence, which is superior to the algorithm discussed in [PS95] , because it also works for infinite attribute sets.
Definition and examples
Definition 17 A Thin Finite Mono specification (in short: TFM specification) is an FM specification (C, M, A), where C is a thin category.
Definition 18 Two TFM specifications (C, M, A) and (C , M , A ) are equal if there exists an isomorphism i : C → C with the following properties:
(ii) For all objects T of C, A(T ) and A (i(T )) have the same cardinality (i.e. are isomorphic as sets).
It should be obvious that two equal TFM specifications are equivalent.
We show in a series of lemmas that, without loss of generality, we may make the following assumptions about a TFM specification (C, M, A):
(i) All the representable functors from C satisfy all monicity conditions in M.
(ii) C is skeletal. (iii) M is closed, in the sense that it contains precisely all sources without doubles in C that are taken to mono sources in all models of (C, M). (iv) A(X) is nonempty for all objects X of C.
These assumptions will simplify the development of the algorithm to decide equivalence of TFM specifications.
That assumption (i) can be made without loss of generality follows from lemma 2.12 in [PS95] .
Assumption (ii) is justified by the following lemma:
Lemma 19 For each TFM specification (C, M, A), there exists an equivalent TFM specification (C , M , A ) with C skeletal.
Proof. Let C be a skeleton of C, and let p be the projection on this skeleton. Let M = {p(µ) | µ ∈ M} and let
It is straightforward to verify that (C , M , A ) and (C, M, A) have equivalent model categories. 2
We will often regard a thin skeletal category C as a partially ordered set C = (C 0 , ≤) (see section 4.2).
Assumption (iv) is justified by:
Lemma 20 For each TFM specification (C, M, A), there exists an equivalent TFM specification (C , M , A ) whith the property that A (T ) is nonempty for all T ∈ C 0 .
Proof. Suppose A(T ) = ∅. Then, in any model (F, λ) of (C, M, A), F (T ) must be the empty set. Hence, (C, M, A) is equivalent to (C , M , A ) with: -C is the full subcategory of C containing all the objects T for which A(T ) is nonempty.
Finally, recall from section 3.1.2 that a source is a mono source iff the same source with all doubles removed is a mono source. Hence, only sources without doubles need be considered for specifications. Moreover, in a finite category C, only a finite number of sources without doubles exist. Because of proposition 2.13 in [PS95] , given an arbitrary TFM specification (C, M, A), we can compute an equivalent new set M of monicity conditions, which contains only sources without doubles, and is closed in the following sense: µ ∈ M iff µ is taken to a mono source by all functors F : C → FinSet which satisfy all monicity conditions in M . This justifies assumption (iii).
Thin categories as posets
A small category with at most one arrow between any two objects is essentially the same as a preordered set. If the thin category is skeletal, then it corresponds to a poset. Let C be a thin category, and X an object of C. We write ↑ X for the full subcategory containing exactly those objects of C that are greater than X. Sometimes, we also have to consider the full subcategory containing exactly those objects of C that are not greater than X. We will denote this preordered set as C\ ↑ X. It is the full subcategory of C, spanned by those objects that have no arrow to X.
Thin MD sketches
The correctness proof of the algorithm for deciding semantical equivalence of TFM specifications will rely on the translation of the specification to a peculiar kind of sketch, a so-called thin MD sketch. MD sketches (not necessarily thin) have already been used in the study of FM specifications ( [PS95, Pie96] ), and some of the results from this section are straightforward extensions of previously published results on MD sketches. Therefore, we will omit most of the proofs in this section, and refer the reader to older work on MD sketches ([PS95,Pie96]) instead.
Definition 21 A double-source in a category C is a pair of two finite sources f i : X → Y i and g i : Z → Y i in C, on the same base.
We say that a double-source (f i , g i ) is disjoint, iff its limit is the initial object. In FinSet, the category of finite sets and functions, this means that there are no elements x ∈ X and z ∈ Z such that f i (x) = g i (z) for all i.
Definition 22 A thin MD sketch is a triple (C, M, D) where C is a thin category, M is a set of finite sources in C, D is a set of double-sources in C.
Definition 23 A model of a thin MD sketch (C, M, D) is a finitely presentable functor from C to FinSet, which takes every source in M to a mono source and every double-source in D to a disjoint double-source.
The reason for requiring finitely presentability will become clear after we study the translation from TFM specifications to thin MD sketches.
For thin MD sketches, disjointness conditions (f i : X → Y i , g i : Z → Y i ) with X = Z make no sense, because such a disjointness condition can only be satisfied if X is taken to the empty set. Hence, we can always find an equivalent thin MD sketch without such disjointness conditions. Therefore, from now on, the assumption will be made that disjointness conditions (
Definition 24 An MD sketch (C, M, D) is in canonical form if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) C is skeletal and Cauchy complete.
(ii) All the representable functors from C are models. (iii) M and D are closed, in the sense that they contain any source (respectively double-source) which is taken to a mono source (respectively disjoint double-source) in every model.
There are two important theorems about thin MD sketches:
Theorem 25 Two MD sketches in canonical form are equivalent iff they are isomorphic.
The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of theorem 2.18 in [PS95] , and hence is not repeated here.
Definition 26 Let (C, M, A) be a TFM specification. Let A ! be the right Kan extension of A along I : C 0 → C and let A ! be the category of elements of A ! , with associated projection Π : A ! → C. We define the translation of (C, M, A) to be the thin MD sketch (C t , M t , D t ) where
Note that C t is thin (because C is thin).
Theorem 27
The model category of a TFM specification (C, M, A) is equivalent to the model category of its translation
The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of theorem 4.3 in [PS95] . This theorem is only valid if one considers only finitely presentable models of thin MD sketches, which is why we required models to be finitely presentable in definition 23.
For TFM specifications, this translation is particularly easy to construct. First, let us construct A ! for A : C 0 → Set where C is thin. We treat C as an ordered set (C 0 , ≤). The set of objects of A ! is:
The ordering relation ≤ of A ! is given by:
where p x : y≤c A(y) → A(x) is the projection.
The verification that this ordered set actually defines A ! is straightforward, and is left to the reader (see [Bor93] for the computation of right Kan extensions).
Example 28 Consider:
Introduction of attributes
In section 3, we have defined selective elimination of attributes. Now, we want to study the inverse process: selective introduction of attributes. The key problem is to recognize those entity types that are sufficiently similar so that we can merge them into one entity type with an attribute. Two entity types c 1 and c 2 which are sufficiently similar will be called an In-redex:
Definition 31 An In-redex of a TFM specification (C, M, A) is a pair (c 1 , c 2 ) of elements of C 0 , such that:
(i) ↑ c 1 and ↑ c 2 are disjoint.
(ii) There exists an isomorphism l : C → C, satisfying the conditions: (a) The following diagram commutes:
where i is the obvious inclusion.
for all x = c 1 (by equality of these sets, we mean equality of their cardinal numbers). (f ) µ ∈ M implies that (µ, l(µ)) is not a double-source.
We prove that this definition indeed characterizes those pairs of entity types that are sufficiently similar to be merged into one entity type with an attribute.
Suppose we are given a TFM specification (C, M, A) and an In-redex (c 1 , c 2 ). We define
This defines a new category C and a functor Π : C → C . We prove that this functor is actually a discrete opfibration. Given an object r of C , we define the functor 2 r : C 0 → FinSet, which takes r to a set with two elements (say {1,2}) and all other objects to a terminal set (say { * }). Let us write Dof (C) for the category of discrete opfibrations over C.
Lemma 32 Π : C → C is a discrete opfibration, and the functor corresponding to Π under the equivalence between Dof (C ) and Fun(C , Set) is (up to natural isomorphism) 2
, as indicated in section 4.3. The set of objects of 2
as follows:
It can be verified that j is an isomorphism making the following diagram commute:
Next, define A : C 0 → Set:
Let α : A → 2 c 1 be the following natural transformation: α c 1 is the function taking all elements of A(c 1 ) to 1 and all elements of A(c 2 ) to 2, and α c , for c = c 1 , is the unique function from A (c) to the terminal set.
Since C is isomorphic to 2
Lemma 33 This arrow α is the pullback α along 2c 1 : I * (2
Proved by inspection.
Finally, define M to be the subset of M containing exactly those sources which lie completely in C .
Definition 35 Suppose we are given a TFM specification (C, M, A) with an In-redex (c 1 , c 2 ), and suppose (C , M , A ) is constructed as indicated above, then we say that (C, M, A) In-reduces to (C , M , A ).
We denote this as (C, M, A) In / / (C , M , A ) .
Theorem 36 If S In / / S then S and S are equivalent.
Proof. This is because S is obtained from S by elimination over α. This fact is easily proved using the lemmas above. The theorem follows then immediately from theorem 15. The only difficulty left is proving that 2
satisfies all monicity conditions in M . This follows from condition (f) in definition 31. 2
Hence, repeatedly In-reducing a TFM specification introduces more and more or larger and larger attribute sets. It is clear that this process of In-reducing must terminate somewhere.
Definition 37 A TFM specification containing no In-redices is said to be in In-normal form.
Every TFM specification can be In-reduced to an In-normal form in a finite number of steps:
Lemma 38 In-reduction is terminating.
Proof. With every In-reduction step, the number of objects of the underlying category of the TFM specification decreases. 2
The main result about In-reduction is that it yields a decision procedure for equivalence:
Theorem 39 (Uniqueness) In-normal forms are unique. Moreover, two TFM specifications are equivalent iff they have the same In-normal form.
The proof of this theorem is rather long and technical, and we give it in a separate section (section 4.5).
Based on theorem 39, we can decide equivalence in the following way: given two TFM specifications S 1 and S 2 , compute their respective In-normal forms. S 1 and S 2 are equivalent iff these In-normal forms are equal. However, recall all the assumptions we have made about TFM specifications (see section 4.1).
If we drop these assumptions, the algorithm to decide equivalence of two TFM specifications works as follows:
(i) Compute two equivalent TFM specifications with the property that all representable functors satisfy all monicity conditions using the algorithm outlined in lemma 2.12 in [PS95] . is an In-redex for specification (2). In-reducing over this In-redex gives a specification equal to specification (1).
Example 41 To show that In-reduction can sometimes introduce attributes where one would not expect it, consider the following specification:
is an In-redex of this specification. Indeed, from a formal point of view, PERSON and BOOK are completely similar in this specification. Inreduction leads to a specification isomorphic to:
In this specification, persons and books are considered to be of entity type OBJECT. Objects can be possessed by a library. For a book object this corresponds to actual possession. For a person object, this means that the person is a
Example 43 Consider specification (3). C t for this specification is category (4). It is easy to see that each of the tuples (1, * , a), (1, * , b), (2, * , a), (2, * , b) defines a section of Π.
Lemma 44 Given all images of sections of Π, it is possible to reconstruct (C, M, A).
Proof. C is of course isomorphic to the image of any section. M is the restriction of M t to the image. It remains to reconstruct A.
Let I c be the set of images of sections of Π containing c, for c ∈ C t 0 . The following equations hold:
and hence the cardinality of any A(Π(c)) can be computed as #( x<c I x )/#I c (remember our assumption that attribute sets are non-empty, and hence the two cardinal numbers above are different from zero). Thus, we reconstruct A up to natural isomorphism. 2
It turns out that, in the case that (C, M, A) is in In-normal form, images of sections of Π can also be characterized independently of C or Π. This characterization is based on the concept of In-redex for an MD sketch. Hence, we first define this concept, and prove a number of lemmas about In-redices for MD sketches.
Again, an In-redex for an MD sketch will be a pair of entity types (c 1 , c 2 ) that are sufficiently similar to be merged into one entity type with an attribute to distinguish between type c 1 and type c 2 . Note the similarity with definition 31. The following lemma states that two objects of the MD sketch that represent the same entity type in the TFM specification, but with a different attribute value, are indeed an In-redex for the MD sketch. To prove this, it suffices to consider x, y ≥ c 1 or x, y ≥ c 2 , because l is the identity on other elements. So, suppose x, y ≥ c 1 (the case x, y ≥ c 2 is handled similarly), and suppose x is compatible with y but l(x) is incompatible with l(y). By lemma 47, we find an In-redex (u, v) with u ≤ l(x) and v ≤ l(y), and u and v incompatible. It must be that u, v ≥ c 2 , because if this was not the case, then l(u) = u and l(v) = v, and hence u ≤ x and v ≤ y, which would mean that u and v are compatible.
Hence, we have an In-redex (u, v) with:
By lemma 48, (l(u), l(v)) is an In-redex, and obviously:
Thus, l(u) and l(v) are a compatible In-redex larger than c 1 , which contradicts the fact that we have chosen (c 1 , c 2 ) to be a maximal compatible In-redex. We conclude that l(x) and l(y) must be compatible. Since images of sections are actually maximal full subposets of compatible elements, we conclude that there exists a section S, such that l(S(x)) is always contained in the image of S. We conclude that (Π(c 1 ), Π(c 2 )) is an In-redex of (C, M, A), which contradicts the fact that (C, M, A) is in In-normal form. Hence, the image of a section cannot contain In-redices. This completes the proof. 2
The proof of the following key lemma is an easy consequence of the previous three lemmas.
Lemma 50 Any two equivalent TFM specifications in In-normal form are equal.
Proof. Two equivalent TFM specifications have the same equivalent canonical MD sketch. By the previous lemma, there is a unique TFM specification in In-normal form corresponding to such an MD sketch. 2
Finally we can prove the uniqueness theorem (theorem 39).
Proof. Every TFM specification is equivalent with each of its In-normal forms (theorem 36). Hence, all In-normal forms of a given TFM specification are equivalent and hence equal by lemma 50. This proves uniqueness of In-normal forms.
If two TFM specifications are equivalent then their In-normal forms are equivalent (theorem 36, and transitivity of equivalence) and hence their In-normal forms are equal (lemma 50).
Vice-versa, if the In-normal forms of two TFM specifications are equal, it follows that the two specifications are equivalent because they are both equivalent to this In-normal form. 2
Conclusion and related work
This paper proves two interesting results in the context of sketch based data specifications. First, it proves the undecidability of the general semantical equivalence problem, by constructing a satisfiability preserving translation from classical first-order logic to finite finitary sketches. This first result is by no means surprising, and not really hard to prove, but because of the practical relevance, we have included a proof in this paper.
Second, we prove the decidability of the semantical equivalence problem for an important subclass of data specifications, the so-called Thin Finite Mono specifications. These TFM specifications can have infinite attribute sets, and hence their models are metafinite structures. The algorithm contained in the decidability proof is probably the first algorithm for deciding semantical equivalence for a non-trivial class of specifications for such metafinite structures.
Our sketch based approach to data specifications is closely related to work by other authors ([JD92,JRW97,CD95]), who have also used some kind of sketches to specify databases. The technique used in this paper for deciding semantical equivalence could turn out to be useful in these other closely related frameworks too.
